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In the fall of 1920, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) suspended Local 
8, a Wobbly branch that encompassed most of the waterfront workers along 
Philadelphia's Delaware River. The crime Philadelphia's longshoremen alleged- 
ly committed was loading a vessel with ammunition intended to supply the ene- 
mies of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The IWW's newspaper Solidarity 
claimed that the union "would rather face death and dismemberment than stand 
the disgrace of having its members render any assistance in keeping its work- 
ers enslaved to the Moloch of capitalism." Thus, the IWW suspended its largest 
and most durable branch as well as its only local with a sizable black member- 
ship and leadership. The Philadelphia Controversy had begun. 
The period during and after World War I was one of the most turbulent in 
U.S. History. In the decade leading up to the war, the IWW had dominated 
America's radical Left. During the war, though, the Wobblies suffered from sys- 
tematic and brutal governmental repression. Many historians believe this cam- 
paign deserves the primary role in explaining the union's decline, even though 
the union's highest official membership occurred after the war. Simultaneously, 
many people sympathetic to the Left found a new champion in the Soviet 
Union. To many, including some American Wobblies and Soviet leader V. I. 
Lenin, it seemed logical that the IWW should fold itself into the Red 
International. But that did not occur. How did communism affect the IWW? 
Why did the IWW, after a flirtatious courtship, reject the communists? Was it 
simply because the IWW had been rendered powerless by the combined gov- 
ernmental and employer offensive often referred to as the Red Scare? The 
answers to these questions are complex and cannot be fully reconstructed, but 
we can better understand the forces that the IWW experienced by analyzing its 
greatest postwar internal struggle, known as the Philadelphia Controversy. 
Hence, one of the primary goals of this essay is to examine the relationship 
between the IWW and communism, a topic almost wholly unexplored. 
Local 8, whose members were notable for being majority African 
American and maintaining job control on the Philadelphia waterfront for more 
than half a decade, found itself suspended from the IWW twice after the war - 
first for allegedly subverting the Bolshevik Revolution, then for violating the 
IWW constitution. The IWW decision to suspend its most powerful and cele- 
brated interracial local had much to do with the union's changing dynamics in 
this era. Or, as Wobbly organizer Claude Erwin phrased it, "There was not a 
large city in the U.S. that looked more promising from an organizational stand- 
point than did Philadelphia. Why did we lose this chance?" Thus, the second 
main purpose of this essay is to understand that the collapse of the IWW had 
much to do with postwar events, including internal conflicts over centralization 
and communism, rather than only wartime repression. In fact, the rifts opened 
in the IWW over communism and local versus national control fed on each 
other, as the Philadelphia Controversy makes clear.' 
Of course, these two themes are interrelated and, together, allow us to 
unpack at least partially the complex and often obscure story of this important 
labor organization. Ben Fletcher, Local 8 and the IWW's most well known 
African American member, discussed the meaning of these issues in the late 
1920s, in correspondence with the pioneering historian of black labor, Abram 
Harris. Fletcher believed, as did Fred Thompson, the "in-house" historian of the 
IWW for four decades, that it was this IWW-Communist Party (CP) conflict 
that lay at the heart of the Philadelphia Controversy. Local 8 found itself caught 
in the midst of a vicious power struggle that greatly harmed the American Left 
in the aftermath of the war. The combination of the CP decision to focus on 
capturing the mainstream American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the ulti- 
mate IWW rejection of Bolshevik overtures resulted in a fierce split between 
these two competing left-wing organizations. It would appear that communists 
in the U.S. thereafter sought to destroy the IWW, beginning with the Wobblies 
most powerful branch, Local 8. Just as Fletcher and Thompson concluded that 
communism, along with Local 8's ongoing conflicts with the IWW national 
leadership, lay at the heart of the Philadelphia Controversy, so will this essay. 
In short, this essay argues that the decline of the IWW occurred in the 1920s, 
due to ideological and internal debates, rather than simply government repres- 
sion during and after World War I, and that the Philadelphia Controversy eluci- 
dates these issues like no other. 
After the bitter wartime repression that the IWW suffered, the Delaware 
River piers in Philadelphia were, very likely, the strongest link in a much- 
weakened Wobbly chain. Local 8 received its IWW charter in 1913, in the 
midst of a successful two-week strike that involved more than 4,000 waterfront 
workers. In the early 19 1 OS, the IWW led several enormous strikes in the east- 
ern textile industry, but in the aftermath of the failed Paterson silk strike of 
19 13, the gaze of scholars - if not the Wobblies themselves - shifts to the west. 
Local 8, however, remained quite active throughout the decade and well into the 
1920s. Even during the war, when the IWW was fiercely attacked by the fed- 
eral government and rival American Federation of Labor, Local 8 maintained 
near total job control. The strongly anti-union employers on Philadelphia's 
docks conceded Local 8's power by hiring Wobblies almost exclusively from 
1913 through 1922, an unprecedented amount of control for a Wobbly branch. 
In addition, Local 8 members had done away with the hated hiring method, the 
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shape-up, earned among the highest wage rates among dock workers nation- 
wide, and influenced how work would be performed in myriad other ways. 
Local 8's success was due to the application of the union's basic principles: 
industrial unionism, ethnic and racial equality, and direct action at the point of 
production. Regardless of ethnicity, gender, nationality, race, or skill, all work- 
ers in the marine transport industry were eligible for membership in Local 8, 
including longshoremen, boatmen, sailors, and even dockside sugar refinery 
workers. If an employer refused to hire Local 8 members, the longshoremen 
engaged in direct action tactics in order to force the bosses to accept worker 
power; for instance, Fred Taylor, who shipped grain through the port of 
Philadelphia, wrote to another shipping company executive of "a great increase 
since that time [the initial 19 13 strike] in the number of longshoremen wearing 
the I.W.W. buttons. Two or three incipient efforts were made through the I.W.W. 
influences to threaten strikes on our boats unless certain men working on them 
without an I.W.W. button were knocked off." Through such militant tactics on 
the docks, Local 8 delivered the goods to Philadelphia's longshoremen, 
decreased racial hostility on the waterfront, and proved to doubters that the 
union could not only preach revolution but also improve immediate wages and 
working  condition^.^ 
The primary reason that Local 8 was hailed by the national Wobbly press 
is because it was the only black-majority, black-led local in the entire IWW. 
Arguably, the ethnic and racial diversity of the U.S. working class has been the 
single most difficult challenge that organized labor historically has faced in lin- 
ing up American workers. Not until the formation of the IWW did a working- 
class organization in America so thoroughly commit itself to racial equality. 
Indeed, Article I, Section I of the IWW's Constitution stated that anyone, 
regardless of color or creed, could become a member. There are several facets 
to this firm ideological stand. The founders of the IWW were steeped in the 
socialist belief that all members of the working class must unite in common 
opposition to their "true" enemy, the employing class. Only through the soli- 
darity of all workers, the Wobblies contended, could the present socio-econom- 
ic order be overturned. Crucially, those present in Chicago in 1905 had forged 
their views in the fires of organizing. They had experienced first hand the myr- 
iad ways that employers divided workers, particularly along racial and ethnic 
lines. Thus, one of the major criticisms of the AFL at the founding convention 
and ever after was that the AFL "does not represent the working class," as 
"Big" Bill Haywood put it. Generally, the AFL excluded many people on 
account of their ethnic or racial heritage, especially African Americans and 
Asian immigrants but also in many cases the "new" immigrants arriving from 
southern and eastern Europe in massive numbers into Atlantic port cities such 
as Philadel~hia.~ 
Yet despite its inclusive ideology, rarely did the IWW organize African 
Americans and even rarer still did blacks seek out the IWW or any other white- 
dominated union, left wing or otherwise. Of course, a long history of exclusion 
and discrimination by white-dominated unions convinced many African 
American workers that unions were not for them, or at least unions with white 
colleagues were not. As Claude McKay's character Zcddy exclaimed in Home 
to Hurlern after scabbing in a New York dock strike, "I'll scab through hell to 
make my living. Scab job or open shop or union am all the same jobs to me. 
White mens don't want niggers in them unions, nohow." Further, the IWW was 
strongest in industries with little black prcsence (logging, hard rock mining, 
textiles) and in regions where few blacks toiled (the Mountain West or Pacific 
Northwest). The first significant attempt took place in the piney woods of 
Louisiana in 19 1 1, but the Brotherhood of Timber Workers experiment ended 
prematurely as a result of massive blacklisting, jailings, and violence. This 
remained the only major Wobbly campaign in the South, where the great major- 
ity of African Americans lived and worked, most of them still in agriculture. It 
was not until the 1913 strike in Philadelphia that the IWW could test its racial 
ideology, with the thousands of African American and immigrant longshore- 
men who searched for a union that would not only accept them as members but 
also treat all of them as equals4 
African Americans made up a plurality of Local 8's initial members and 
soon, due to the rising numbers of blacks on the waterfront, made up a major- 
ity of the union.5 Some of the blacks hailed originally from Philadelphia, but 
many migrated from the upper South and a few were men of African descent 
who had immigrated from the West Indies. Moreover, African Americans 
always held important leadership positions in the local, from chapter presidents 
to chairmen of meetings to strike captains. In particular, the native-born 
Philadelphian Benjamin H. Fletcher had been an important force in maintain- 
ing unity across ethnic and racial lines on the piers since the founding of the 
local. Fletcher, a rather dark-skinned African American, joined the IWW 
around 191 1 - along with, quite possibly, the Socialist Party - and became an 
active street speaker for the IWW in Philadelphia by 1912, all prior to the for- 
mation of Local 8. Fletcher attended several IWW national conventions, 
organized dockers up and down the Atlantic coast throughout the decade, and 
was celebrated in the IWW press. He also was the sole black Wobbly to be 
arrested during the wartime raids. One of Fletcher's many fellow black long- 
shoremen, James Fair, recalled years later, "We would have our pep talks and 
what not and Fletcher, after he made a speech or something or another, soli- 
darity, all for one and one for 
The key to Local 8's success was its interracialism. If Local 8 had been all- 
black, its affiliation with the IWW still would be significant, but it must be 
highlighted that more than one thousand of the local's members were white - 
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that is, native-born European Americans, primarily of Irish descent, or 
European immigrants, mostly Poles and Lithuanians. Much recent scholarship, 
most notably that of David Roediger, argues that these "new" immigrants were 
not white upon arrival but, rather, had to learn what it meant to be white in the 
United States. In other words, European immigrants were forced to learn a set 
of race relations in which people ofAfrican descent were considered, by whites, 
inferior to those who hailed from Europe. In the short term, however, European 
immigrants who worked Philadelphia's docks did not immediately perceive 
their black fellow workers as racially inferior and by the same token, African 
Americans did not automatically see Poles, Lithuanians, or Italians as white, 
per se. Therefore, arguably, it was easier for African Americans to organize 
with these "new" immigrants than native-born whites, although as mentioned 
Local 8 included hundreds of Irish Americans, as well. Philadelphia's long- 
shoremen, thus, were black and white, native-born and immigrant, Catholic, 
Protestant, and Jewish. Clearly, if any union was to succeed on the Delaware 
riverfront, it would have to address this issue. Local 8 was one of only a hand- 
ful of unions prior to the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) era, per- 
haps the most successful one, that actively and effectively organized across 
ethnic and racial divides that ordinarily kept organized labor in the U.S. from 
being as effective as it could be. But, what separates Local 8 even from the 
other exceptional multiracial unions of the Progressive Era, such as Alabama's 
coal miners and the longshoremen of New Orleans, is that Local 8 always was 
a fully integrated organization, usually with black leaders, while the others, 
technically, maintained segregated locals, mostly with white leaders, that 
worked closely together.' 
But, was Local 8 truly a model that other Wobbly branchcs should emu- 
late? Were Local 8's loyalties to the IWW and broader ideals of waging the 
class struggle or to the more mundane concerns of effecting wage increases and 
reduced hours? Perhaps it was just an AFL-style union in Wobbly clothing? 
These charges would be leveled at Local 8 on more than one occasion, and 
would come to a head in 1920. Events on the Philadelphia waterfront in the 
years following World War I tell us a great deal about what the IWW and mil- 
lions of other socialist-minded American workers went through during this 
time. How would the IWW respond to the dramatic changes that included the 
continuing Red Scare, the employer's national Open Shop campaign, rising 
racial and ethnic tensions, and the reshaping of radicalism the world over in 
response to the Soviet Union? In short, what course should Local 8 and the 
IWW steer in the turbulent waters of postwar America? The Philadelphia 
Controversy reveals what the main ideological issues confronting the IWW 
were, and how the union would respond to the rapidly changing national and 
international scenes. Incredibly, considering the ongoing fascination with the 
IWW, the standard surveys of the IWW all are more than thirty years old and 
only a handful of case studies have been undertaken in the interim. Until recent 
years, Local 8, arguably the most fully integrated union of its time, has not 
attracted a scholar to tell its story. The first and one of the few historians to dis- 
cuss Local 8, in fact, was uninterested in the issue of diversity; as John Gambs 
wrote, "The race question, however, though dormantly existing, does not con- 
cern us." Further, no historian satisfactorily explores the events that seem cen- 
tral to explaining why the IWW self-destructed after the war. Historians such 
as Melvyn Dubofsky, have discussed how communism ripped apart the IWW, 
but only in very general terms. The experiences of Local 8, especially the 
Philadelphia Controversy but also the appearance of Garveyism, provide 
insight into how and why the IWW ceased to be a dynamic organization by the 
mid- 1 920s8 
While not without difficulties, LocaI 8 forged a heterogeneous workforce 
into a unified and powerful group. Local 8 was a force on the Delaware River 
from 1913 until 1927. In its first decade, Local 8 was able to significantly 
increase the wages of its members, reduce the hours they worked, make the 
docks a safer workplace, and, essentially, decasualize waterfront work since 
most employers only hired longshoremen with that month's union button. Most 
impressively, considering that it was so rarely achieved elsewhere, was the 
interracial unity that the union achieved. African Americans made up a major- 
ity of the membership and leadership but significant numbers of Irish 
Americans, Poles, and Lithuanians also belonged to the organization. Further, 
integration not only existed in the union hall; Local 8 maintained integrated 
work gangs on the docks where previously, and after the fall of Local 8, gangs 
were segregated. No doubt, Local 8 retained the allegiances of the longshore- 
men because it successfully defused racial hostility and delivered bread and 
butter gains for its members. While the wartime repression hurt LocaI 8 - four 
of its leaders were among the hundred or so Wobblies arrested nationally - the 
union's power remained undeniable. One federal agent, who had travelled 
throughout the nation investigating IWW activities, reported in late 1918 that 
Local 8 included, "practically all the stevedores employed in this po a...[ and] 
absolutely controls the labor along the water front.. ..I was more than surprised 
to find that the 1.W.W.s. had gained more ground in Philadelphia than any other 
city in the United States, even more than in Seattle, and they are still gaining."9 
Yet despite this success, in the summer of 1920, the IWW suspended Local 
8. In their defense, Local 8 leaders E. F. Doree, Ben Fletcher, Walter Nef, and 
others compiled "A Complete and Detailed Statement of All That Has 
Occurrecl" which they entitled The Philadelphia Controversy. The cover page 
of this booklet boldly declared, "The I.W.W. must now decide whether it shall 
be an industrial union in name only or whether it shall be an industrial union in 
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fact. The day of test is here. We have sacrificed much for the principle of indus- 
trial unionism, now let's have it." How the members of Local 8 responded to 
these events would determine their future in the IWW and their ability to retain 
power along the Delaware River, as well as how the IWW responded to com- 
munism.'O 
On Thursday, August 5, 1920 word arrived at the New York headquarters 
of the Marine Transport Workers Industrial Union that the steamship 
Westmount, scheduled for loading in Philadelphia, was to take on ammunition 
intended for General Wrangel, a leader of a "White" Russian army fighting the 
"Red" Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War. The Soviet Bureau in New York 
threatened to publicize this "treasonous" act of Local 8 in the labor and radical 
press unless the loading stopped immediately. James Scott, a white man and 
secretary-treasurer of the Marine Transport Workers Industrial Union (MTW), 
sent a telegram announcing that he and several members of the IWW's General 
Executive Board (GEB), were traveling to Philadelphia on "important" busi- 
ness, without providing specifics. Scott arrived in Philadelphia that same 
evening and demanded that a meeting be called the next day to "knock the men 
off" the Westmount immediately or the union would be expelled. Local 8 lead- 
ers Ben Fletcher, Polly Baker, and others protested to Scott that such a meeting 
could not be arranged on such short notice. The local's by-laws specified that 
to call a meeting at any time other than the regularly-scheduledTuesday session 
had to be announced in circulars and handbills distributed along the fifteen 
mile waterfront. Typically, two days were required to notify the 5,000 members. 
Fletcher also asked Scott why Local 8 had not received word from the full GEB 
in Chicago." 
Scott continued to press his case the following day. Local business agent 
Polly Baker, a Lithuanian immigrant, took Scott to see Meeting Chairman Sam 
White at Pier 19, where White, an African American, was working a ship. Like 
the other Philadelphians, White, who was officially responsible for calling 
Local 8's meetings, protested that a representative meeting could not happen so 
quickly. At Scott's insistence, White relented but prior to the meeting that night, 
he notified Scott that "as chairman, [White] could not conscientiously entertain 
any motion on the subject because of the small number present." Thus, the 
membership would continue loading the ship until precise instructions were 
received from national headquarters.12 
That evening, Scott and the GEB members addressed the fewer than 200 
union members who assembled at the hastily convened meeting. The long- 
shoremen informed Scott that they had not known the destination of the muni- 
tions, a reasonable possibility considering that countless tons of weapons and 
ammunition had passed through the port since the beginning of the war. Many 
of the Local 8 members present claimed that a larger meeting was required to 
take action and decided that they would not halt loading the Westmount until 
such a gathering occurred. As evidence that the first meeting had been called 
too quickly to be representative, a good many members - notably Assistant 
Secretary George Hellwig, an African American, and rank and file leader 
Ernest Varlack, a St. Thomas native, both of whom had been working in distant 
parts of the port, did not even hear of the meeting until after the meeting.13 
The next day, at a meeting in Chicago the General Executive Board decid- 
ed to revoke Local 8's charter. The GEB based its decision on the reports of the 
two board members who had visited Philadelphia as well as one received from 
Scott that included a "Statement of Resolutions Committee of New York 
Branches" calling for Local 8's expulsion. In fact, New York's IWW branches 
printed an extra edition of their newspaper, Fellow Worker, in order to demand 
Local 8's expulsion. At its regular business meeting on Tuesday, August 10, 
Local 8's members voted to await word from the GEB on the "powder ques- 
tion." On August 13 the local finally received a telegram from General 
Secretary-Treasurer Thomas Whitehead informing them of the expulsion, with 
notice that they could appeal at the next general convention the following May, 
ten months away. According to Local 8, "The Philadelphia Branch was at the 
height of its power when the controversy over the 'powder' question started." 
There is no evidence that the white national leadership was targeting the black- 
majority Local 8 or that the Philadelphians believed their suspension to be 
racially motivated.14 
Rather, Philadelphia's longshoremen werc expelled for "a crime against 
the working class," namely loading munitions aboard a ship allegedly bound for 
Russia to supply the "white" Wrangel. The IWW, although primarily an 
American organization, preached solidarity with the working class throughout 
the world, as the very name of the union attests. Longshoremen and sailors 
were particularly conscious of international issues because of the industry in 
which they worked, or as one Wobbly put it, "To the marine worker the term 
industrial solidarity means international solidarity at one and the same time." 
Like many other socialist groups, the Wobblies strongly supported the Russian 
Revolution at first. The GEB claimed as late as 1920 that "The I. W. W. views 
the accomplishments of the Soviet government of Russia with breathless inter- 
est and intense admiration." Indeed, some Wobblies traveled to the Soviet 
Union to help build the world's first socialist state, thousands sent money from 
their limited wages to help the new nation, and others abandoned the IWW to 
join one of America's nascent communist parties. Thus, the longshoremen of 
Local 8 "betrayed the international labor movement by loading shrapnel shells 
consigned to the infamous Allied catspaw, Wrangel, for the purpose of drown- 
ing the Russian revolution in a sea of blood." Accordingly, the IWW expelled 
Local 8, despite its power on the Philadelphia waterfront; or, in the more col- 
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orful language of the Wobblies, the IWW "had bit off more than it could chew 
and [therefore] we had to spit it out."15 
While it is undeniable that the United States government actively worked 
to defeat the Bolsheviks during this period, there is simply no extant evidence 
to support or deny that the Whites were being supplied through Philadelphia or 
that Local 8 loaded any such vessel. In fact, far more likely, the U.S. was sup- 
plying its forces, based in the Siberian port of Vladivostok, out of Seattle; 
Seattle longshoremen had uncovered boxes of machine guns in crates marked 
sewing machines in late 1919. On one level, whether or not the longshoremen 
actually loaded ammunition intended for Wrangel is not as important as the 
accusation, for what ultimately was at stake was which path the IWW would 
take: join the communists who were sweeping through much of the Left world- 
wide or remain with an international group of syndicalists who were in the 
process of unsuccessfully challenging the Bolshevik~. '~  
The same day Local 8 received its expulsion notice, GEB Chairman 
George Speed arrived in Philadelphia. Speed - who had served time in 
Leavenworth with Local 8 leaders E.F. Doree, Ben Fletcher, Walter Nef, and 
John J. Walsh - had visited Philadelphia frequently over the years, most notably 
in May 19 13 when he helped to organize the longshoremen during their initial 
strike. At the regular Tuesday meeting, August 17, the Philadelphia longshore- 
men explained to Speed that they had been on poor terms with the New York 
MTW, and James Scott in particular, ever since the MTW headquarters had 
been moved from Philadelphia to New York the previous year. Many members 
complained of Scott's heavy-handed and domineering treatment of the 
Philadelphians, without a doubt the strongest branch of the MTW. In particu- 
lar, Local 8's power essentially to control the MTW's elections, based upon its 
enormous membership, apparently irked Scott. According to veteran IWW 
organizer Walsh, an Irish American, the Philadelphians refused to listen to 
Scott, but they would stop loading if the GEB ordered them to do so. In his 
report to the GEB, however, Scott never mentioned that Local 8 was awaiting 
word from Chicago. Speed then addressed the membership for over an hour 
about the importance of international labor solidarity. After Speed's talk, the 
membership unanimously passed a resolution boycotting all longshore work 
involving war material, accompanied by a notification of expulsion for any one 
who did load ammunition. The next morning Local 8's business agent Polly 
Baker went to the Broad Street pier where the Westmount was being loaded and 
pulled the gang of forty Wobblies who had been working aboard it." 
Still, it would be another month before the IWW reinstated Local 8. 
George Speed returned to Chicago with the intention of convincing the GEB to 
reverse their expulsion of Local 8 immediately. Speed argued that, by quitting 
work on the Westmount as soon as the members understood the situation, Local 
8 had acted in the proper manner and he would not have approved of the local's 
expulsion if he had been fully informed. Speed later wrote Walsh that "I feel I 
made a grievous mistake in our hasty decision." The newly elected GEB decid- 
ed that Local 8 should remain suspended for a while longer, in order to appre- 
ciate the gravity of the situation. But, the new GEB also acknowledged that 
"the Phil[adelphia] Dist[rict] is not wholly to blame" for the difficulties and 
decided to take control of the MTW until new officers could be elected. In 
October, when the longshoremen finally received their charter back, everyone 
thought that an unfortunate chapter in the history of the union would be put 
behind them.ls 
However, one other issue still remained that would drive a wedge between 
Quakertown's longshoremen and the national leadership. Local 8 blatantly vio- 
lated the IWW's constitutionally mandated $2 initiation fee. Although it is not 
clear exactly when it was first implemented - no such high assessment existed 
before or during the war - as of August 1920 Local 8 charged a $2 initiation 
and a $22.25 assessment, a total of almost $25 for new members! The reasons 
for this change are important to understand. The union had been hurt by numer- 
ous events in 1920 including: the maritime depression that resulted in a huge 
surplus of longshoremen on the docks, the start of a major employer Open 
Shop campaign, the arrival of dozens of Wobbly "floaters" from Seattle who 
wanted to use the IWW's universal transfer feature to become instant members 
of Local 8, and a stand-off in Local 8's summer strike that involved almost 
10,000 workers. In its document The Philadelphia Controversy, Doree and Nef 
argued on behalf of Local 8 that the rise in initiation fees was needed in order 
to operate effectively as a union, especially in the aftermath of a massive strike 
in which 4,000 members temporarily had joined at a rate of $1.25. The long- 
shoremen contended that, while the hike violated the constitution, there was no 
important principle at stake; Local 8 believed that it was more important to 
maintain a stable membership and treasury. Nevertheless, the IWW national 
leadership remained adamant that Local 8 reduce its initiation fee. The 
Philadelphians held a meeting on October 20, at a hall large enough to accom- 
modate the entire membership, to discuss the issue. At that meeting, the mem- 
bers of Local 8 refused to compromise on the issue of lowering its initiation 
fee." 
Thus, although the "powder question" had been resolved, this second 
issue, lowering the initiation fee to the constitutionally mandated $2, again 
threatened Local 8's position in the IWW. In other words, what had been a con- 
flict over the IWW's stance on communism and the Soviet Union had trans- 
formed into a disagreement over the centralization of power within the IWW 
and the potentially contradictory goals of maintaining job control while also 
advocating the overthrow of the capitalist system. That fall a series of increas- 
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ingly adversarial telegrams travelled among Local 8 in Philadelphia, MTW 
headquarters in New York, and the GEB in Chicago. The MTW and GEB insist- 
ed that Local 8's initiation fee be lowered immediately to $2 and no additional 
assessments be charged to new members. Recently-elected Local 8 Secretary 
Walter Nef, a German Swiss immigrant, consistently responded that the 
Philadelphians were considering the issue but did not want to destroy the organ- 
ization they had worked so hard to build. Local 8 suggested that a nationwide 
referendum be held on the constitutional issue of initiation fees. As a result of 
Local 8's unwillingness to lower its initiation fee, the GEB informed Local 8 
that they had until December 1 to comply or else stand suspended again.20 
In a fascinating letter published in the IWW's main publication, Solidarity, 
Local 8 leader E.F. Doree, born in Philadelphia to Swedish immigrants, argued 
quite forcefully for a high initiation fee in order to maintain job control along 
the Philadelphia waterfront. Doree suggested that forcing Local 8 to comply 
ultimately involved two issues: whether the IWW should continue to experi- 
ment regarding the structure and tactics of the union and whether shop control 
should be sacrificed over a technical issue that did not compromise a "first" 
principle. On the subject of experimentation, Doree recalled that he and Nef 
helped found the Agricultural Workers Organization (AWO) in 1915, which 
had revitalized the entire IWW. The AWO charter also had violated the IWW 
constitution at the time, but the GEB, "acting as revolutionists and practical 
men rather than as ultra-constitutionalists, felt that the experiment was neces- 
sary." Doree maintained that the situation in Philadelphia paralleled the AWO's. 
As for the second issue, Doree contended that the IWW consistently had failed 
to maintain shop control, except in Philadelphia, where almost all waterfront 
employers had agreed to hire members of Local 8 exclusively. The local 
believed its continuing power depended upon limiting the entry of workers into 
an industry notorious for large labor surpluses and only could be managed 
through a high initiation fee. With low initiation fees and irregular work, many 
workers joined, dropped out, and rejoined the union. In order to establish a truly 
powerful union, as had occurred on the Philadelphia waterfront, Doree argued, 
"it must be built upon a permanent membership who pay dues regularly." Few 
Philadelphia longshoremen let their dues lapse in slack times because then they 
would have to pay the high initiation fee for a second time; thus Local 8 could 
maintain a large base of members. Clearly, Doree's argument follows those 
made by AFL craft unions - that to maintain power a union must fight for a 
closed shop and regulate those who can gain access to the union.21 
Considering its success, Doree suggested that Local 8 be allowed to con- 
tinue its "experiment," at least until the next convention when the issue could 
be discussed by the entire national organization. Doree condemned the manda- 
tory low initiation fee - "this straight-jacketing of experiments" - that had 
proven "a failure," for it neither supplied the IWW with sufficient finances nor 
encouraged members to keep up their dues. In response to those who com- 
plained high initiation fees hindered organizing, Doree asked "WHERE ARE 
THE MEMBERS????" Doree contrasted the initiation issue with signing con- 
tracts that, according to him, did violate basic IWW principles. The IWW, 
including Local 8, never signed time contracts with employers because that 
would limit their ability to strike (either for their own benefit or in sympathy 
with fellow workers) and syndicalists must be able to act at the point of pro- 
duction in order to achieve their goals. Of course, the counter-argument was 
that by requiring such a high initiation fee, many workers could not afford the 
IWW's red card. In response, Doree claimed that a high initiation fee did not 
compromise the IWW's ironclad commitment to working class solidarity; in 
fact, in The Philadelphia Controversy, the longshoremen argued that since a 
Local 8 member could easily make $40 in a week, the initiation fee was not 
exorbitant. Doree concluded that Local 8 had labored too hard building up its 
organization to sacrifice it in the name of a "technicality." But, if forced to 
lower its initiation fee, "The Greatest shop-control of the I.W.W. will have 
passed away. The I.W.W. will have done what the bosses were unable to do." At 
its November 9 meeting and again three weeks later, the branch reaffirmed that 
it would not lower the initiation fee.22 
Not surprisingly, on December 4 Local 8 received notification from MTW 
headquarters that the longshoremen's branch had been suspended, "On account 
of Philadelphia failing to live up to the Executive Boards [sic] instruction to 
live up to the Constitution of the I.W.W." Further, Ben Fletcher and Ernest 
Varlack, as members of the now-suspended Local 8, were denied their seats as 
secretary-treasurer of the MTW and member of the General Organizing 
Committee respectively, despite being "overwhelmingly elected" in recent bal- 
loting. Since Local 8 made up a large majority of the MTW's total membership, 
Fletcher's and Varlack's victories were givens. The second suspension conve- 
niently kept Local 8 from taking control of the MTW.23 
The significance and contentiousness of the issue kept the Philadelphia 
Controversy alive within the IWW for months after the suspension went into 
effect. Doree's powerful letter actually was published in the pages of Solidarity 
several days after Local 8's suspension. The following week, former GEB 
member August Walquist, who had belonged to the GEB when Local 8 initial- 
ly was suspended in August, wrote, "A Plain Statement of Facts Regarding 
Philadelphia Situation." While not apologizing for his actions, Walquist 
expressed his agreement with Doree's argument for the need for experimenta- 
tion and higher initiation fees. Walquist suggested that the MTW draft a refer- 
endum to be voted upon by the entire membership of the IWW. The following 
week, GEB Chairman Roy Brown and GEB member Adolph Lessing respond- 
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ed that Local 8's actions clearly were unconstitutional and that the GEB had no 
choice but to suspend it in accordance with the constitution. Instead of acting 
independently, the branch should have raised the issue at the national conven- 
tion. The debate raged in the newspaper for several more months through let- 
ters from members and editorials. Even though many letters condemned Local 
8's actions, one Wobbly, E. W. Latchem, praised the longshoremen as "they are 
the only branch of the I. W. W. who have been successful in organizing and 
holding within the organization any large number of colored workers."24 
Ultimately, the Philadelphia Controversy concerned the manner in which 
the IWW would deal with the most pressing issue facing socialist organizations 
around the world - how to react to the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. 
Immediately after the revolution, support from the IWW and other left-wing 
organizations was nearly universal, believing the Bolshevik takeover signaled 
the beginning of the overthrow of capitalism worldwide. Many Americans, both 
sympathizers and opponents of the Russian Revolution, saw the events in 
America during 19 19, most notably the Seattle General Strike, as evidence that 
the United States might be swept into revolution as well. By the summer of 
1920, though, most of the strikes had been defeated, the Red Scare continued 
to expand, and support for the Bolsheviks had waned. Like many left-wing 
organizations, the Wobblies were divided into multiple camps, with some 
ardently in favor and others equally adamant in their opposition to the Soviet 
Union, while a third group remained sympathetic to but wary of the 
Bolsheviks. The quickness and severity with which the GEB initially acted in 
the Philadelphia Controversy suggests that the issues involved went far beyond 
the particular actions of Local 8. In 1919, the Soviet Union was trying to secure 
the IWW's allegiance and tolerated its "dual union" approach of organizing 
head-to-head against the more mainstream AFL. Concurrently, a pro-Soviet 
GEB sought to establish formal ties with the Soviet Union by urging the IWW 
to join the Soviet-dominated Third International (Comintern). Considering its 
sympathies, when the allegation of Local 8 loading munitions for the Whites 
surfaced, the GEB's swift suspension of Local 8 makes sense. The highly 
respected Local 8 leader Ben Fletcher later argued that General Secretary- 
Treasurer Thomas Whitehead, MTW Secretary-Treasurer James Scott and three 
members of the GEB were "agents of Moscow" and that Local 8's suspension 
was based upon a "flimsy charge."25 
When a new, anti-soviet GEB took over in late August 1920 it became 
clear that the IWW would not ally itself with the Soviet Union. For instance, 
the new GEB immediately withdrew Harrison George's pro-Soviet pamphlet 
Red Dawn. That fall and winter, a bitter debate ensued over the issue of affili- 
ation with the Third International until the IWW decided against joining. By 
the end of 1921, the IWW also had chosen not to join the Red International of 
Labor Unions (RILU), a Soviet-led world federation of left-wing unions. 
Historian Melvyn Dubofsky cites the Philadelphia Controversy as one example 
of the IWW's increasing isolation from American and international radical 
movements that embraced the Soviet Union. That the American Wobblies 
opposed the communists was highly controversial - even if the Wobs' anarcho- 
syndicalist based fears of Soviet totalitarianism proved to be accurate in retro- 
spect. Dubofsky also contends that due to the power it wielded, Local 8 
"inevitably" came into conflict with the "putative" national leadership of the 
IWW. That is, without a power base of its own, the GEB "clung to outdated rev- 
olutionary precepts" (e.g. very low initiation fees) rather than attempting to 
adapt to a changing economic and political postwar America (that included an 
employer offensive as well as the rise of communism). In short, the conflict 
inside the IWW over communism and Local 8's problems with the national 
leadership are interconnected on multiple 
Fred Thompson, the longtime in-house historian of the IWW, contends that 
communism was wracking the IWW from within and Local 8 was caught in the 
crossfire. In a 1982 letter, Thompson speculated that if, in fact, the United 
States had been shipping arms to the Whites, it would have been done covert- 
ly. Thompson wrote that, "In Seattle [a Pacific port], suspicious longshoremen 
wondering why so many crated sewing machines were being sent to 
Vladivostok [also on the Pacific Ocean, in eastern Siberia], let one crate break 
open and found guns - and stopped shipment. Something like this is plausible 
- but I wonder why ship to Vladivostok through an Atlantic port [like 
Philadelphia]? There was a well-equipped American force in Siberia - it 
mutinied eventually. I am certain that any Philadelphia IWW who knew arms 
were being shipped to intervene in Russia would have used union channels and 
procedures [i.e. direct action] to stop it." Thompson concluded that it would 
come as no surprise to him if the Communist Party or its allies within the IWW 
had "cooked up" the Wrangel arms story to subvert the IWW in Philadelphia.27 
Ben Fletcher, the most well known and respected leader of Local 8, offered 
a similar theory to Thompson's half a century prior, in the late 1920s. 
According to Fletcher, when the communists realized that they could not "cap- 
ture the Port,'' that is, seize control of Local 8 for the Communist Party, they 
engaged in a "Liquidating Program upon orders from Moscow," although 
Fletcher offered no other specifics. As mentioned above, Fletcher also con- 
tended that James Scott, the New York leader of the IWW's maritime union, 
was a communist. While Fletcher's argument cannot be proven, interestingly, a 
1922 IWW letter to the CP notes that Scott was no longer a member of the 
IWW - very possibly he had left for the CP. Finally, in a brief but tantalizing 
report, the IWW's own General Ofice Bulletin (October 1920) reported that, 
"When the [new] G. E. B. came into office, they were confronted with the tur- 
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moil of the Philadelphia situation; Communist influence being exercised with- 
in and without the organization." Although it is not clear when he joined the CP, 
Roy Brown, the GEB Chairman in the summer of 1920 when the Philadelphia 
Controversy first arose, was organizing for the communists as late as 1930, 
according to historian John S. G a r n b ~ . ~ ~  
Fred Thompson's theory seems much more plausible in the context of the 
bitter fighting within the IWW over communism occurring in 1920. This bat- 
tle, begun in 19 18 and continuing through the early 1920s, was replicated in 
left-wing circles in America and throughout the world. Thompson correctly 
suggests that by late 1920, it became clear that nothing comparable to the 
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia would occur in Western Europe or the United 
States, although pro-capitalist forces in the U.S. had engineered the Red Scare 
just to make sure. Many Bolsheviks, most notably Lenin, arrived at the same 
conclusion by the spring of 1920. With this realization, Lenin ordered commu- 
nist supporters to abandon their dual unions and enter the mainstream labor 
movements in their respective nations. In the spring of 1920, Lenin wrote the 
pamphlet "Left-Wng" Communism: An infantile Disorder, in which he 
attacked communist parties in West European nations for remaining outside of 
the mainstream, albeit "reactionary," trade union movements. Lenin concluded 
that those working for communism "must imperatively work wherever the 
masses are to be found." The Second Congress of the Communist International, 
held in Moscow in July-August, 1920, not surprisingly, adopted Lenin's posi- 
tion on the necessity of a proletariat political party and ending dual unionism. 
However, most syndicalists present, including the British Shop Stewards' 
Movement, opposed the Comintern's policies. Notably, even the (U.S.) United 
Communist Party delegation, represented by the former Wobbly John Reed, 
voted against the measure because of their belief that the conservative AFL 
could never be taken over and turned to the left.29 
In the United States the abrupt policy shift ordered by Lenin meant that all 
communists, including those still in the IWW, should abandon their dual, left 
wing unions and join the AFL. Only in industries in which no operative AFL 
union existed would the Communist International "permit" the IWW to organ- 
ize - specifically, in the agriculture and timber industries and no others. In an 
unsigned "Instructions for [CP] Work in the United States," it was ordered that 
"a consistent effort [be] made to bring into line the revolutionary and semi-rev- 
olutionary groups outside of the general labor movement [i.e. the AFL]"; the 
IWW was the first group targeted in this 1921 letter spelling out the Red 
International's mission in the United States. The marine transport industry, 
however, arguably fell into a third category, since the AFLs International 
Seamen's Union (ISU) and the IWW's MTW were of roughly equal strength in 
1920- 192 1. After a failed strike in 192 1, the ISU's membership plummeted, 
many lining up with the MTW. The communists were well aware of the MTW's 
power: A 192 1 "Report on the IWW," commented, "Marine transport and tex- 
tile organization being the only semblance of organized unions" still active in 
the IWW, these groups should be targeted for recruitment. According to the 
IWW's Thompson, as reliable a source as any on this murky subject, a debate 
apparently took place as to whether the communists should capture the MTW 
or ISU. Eventually, Thompson contends that the ISU was endorsed and com- 
munists told to enter its ranks. Those communists within the MTW "were told 
to encourage disruption there, rumor-mongering, waste of resources on things 
that wouldn't work, etc." Thompson wrote of the communists' "game plan - 
same as their lies about the MTW in Philadelphia shipping arms to wrangle 
[sic], and other disruptive acts throughout the IWW?"'O 
The ongoing Russian Civil War is the other factor at work in the Wrangel 
story. In the late summer of 1920, General Wrangel was leading an offensive 
against the Red Army in the Crimea. By this time the Bolsheviks had defeated 
nearly all of their enemies in the Russian Civil War, and Wrangel's offensive 
represented the greatest threat to the Soviets' final victory. On August 19, the 
Politburo announced that "The Vrangel [Wrangel] front is to be recognized as 
the main one." In fact, the Bolsheviks were so fearful of Wrangel's "Russian 
Army" that they temporarily allied with another opponent, Nestor Makhno's 
band of Ukrainian peasant anarchists. It is conceivable that the same fear of 
Wrangel that led Lenin and Trotsky to collaborate with Makhno led some of 
their emissaries at the Soviet Bureau in New York to jump on a rumor and trans- 
form it into something much more, something that had to be stopped immedi- 
ately and at all costs. Hence, the beginning of the Philadelphia Controversy. 
Whether communists invented the Wrangel story to subvert Local 8 or whether 
they hastily acted in an effort to support the Revolution in Russia is unknown. 
What is clear is that by August 1920, the conflict between the rising commu- 
nists and declining IWW was very real. The Comintern's official policy was to 
bore from within the AFL, so the IWW chose not to attend future Comintern 
sessions. There would be no communist support for Local 8 or any other MTW 
branch of the IWW, but there remained a fierce struggle for the allegiance of 
thousands of Wobbly longshoremen and sailors in Philadelphia and across the 
globe.3' 
Information on communist influence in Local 8 is spotty at best and non- 
existent at worst. Ben Fletcher, who played only a limited role in Local 8 after 
getting out of Leavenworth, and Bureau of Investigation Agent Joseph 
McDevitt both make anecdotal references suggesting that communists 
belonged to Local 8 and had influence. There are no references to Local 8 in 
the Communist Party USA records that the Library of Congress possesses after 
receiving a microfilm copy from Moscow following the collapse of the Soviet 
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Union. Of course, the late 1910s and early 1920s was a heady time among left- 
ists the world over, the United States included, so it is not unreasonable to 
assume that some Philadelphia Wobblies joined the Bolsheviks. 
Unquestionably, members of Local 8 frequently debated the subject of com- 
munism at their meetings; for instance, at an IWW open forum in Philadelphia 
on December 19, 1920, William E. Smith, the leader of the English speaking 
Philadelphia branch of the United Communist Party, spoke for an hour on the 
Bolshevik program. Still, nothing firm is known. Years after the Philadelphia 
Controversy, Big Bill Haywood, the famous Wobbly leader who jumped bail 
and spent his remaining years in the Soviet Union, was quoted by communist 
author Claude McKay as saying that the Polish members of Local 8 were decid- 
edly anti-Bolshevik. Yet, it would be reasonable to assume that at least some 
Wobbly longshoremen in Philadelphia were attracted to the ideals and success 
of the Bolsheviks. However, since Local 8 had a black majority, the preaching 
of communism probably would have fallen on many deaf ears, if for no other 
reason than in the 1920s communists devoted little serious consideration to 
issues of race. Although key black leaders in the CP would join in the 1920s, it 
would not be until the 1930s that the Communist Party started attracting sig- 
nificant black support in America.32 
Considering that the majority of Local 8's members were African 
American, though, possibly a greater threat to the IWW was the rising tide of 
black nationalism under the banner of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro 
Improvement Association (UNIA). The UNIA was the largest mass-based 
movement in African American history up to that time and it displayed a good 
deal of strength in Philadelphia. In the summer of 19 19 Garvey helped organ- 
ize a Philadelphia chapter, Division 47, of UNIA. The Reverend James Walker 
Hood Eason, who founded the People's Metropolitan A. M. E. Zion Church and 
became disillusioned with the local NAACP, held the powerful Chaplain- 
General post in UNIA until August 1920, when he was promoted to "Leader of 
American Negroes," the third highest position in the international organiza- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Division 47 grew quite quickly and declined equally fast. Evidence of 
UNIA's popularity among Philadelphia's black population abounds. Despite the 
opposition of most of the city's black clergy and middle class, close to 10,000 
people joined in less than a year, second in membership only to New York. Over 
6,000 people attended a fundraiser at the Academy of Music for the Black Star 
Line, UNIA's shipping line intended to transport people of African descent 
back to Africa. Black Star Line stocks were traded in the city. In the spring of 
1920 the Black Star Line vessel Yarmouth arrived in Philadelphia from the 
West Indies on its way to New York. That fall the chapter raised $6,000 for the 
African nation of Liberia. In 1920 Garvey called Philadelphia "one of our 
greatest strongholds." However, over the next two years, massive internal dis- 
sension, violence among the membership, including the murder of Eason while 
in New Orleans, and financial problems led to a destructive split in the local 
chapter. In 1923, Division 47 still claimed 6,000 members but never equaled its 
power of a few years earlier.34 
Generally Local 8's black majority emphasized class solidarity across 
racial lines in an otherwise segregated and racist metropolis, but it seems 
impossible that at least some of the black longshoremen were not enticed by the 
powerful ideas of Garvey. Yet, there is but one reference, and that one indirect, 
to the potential influence of black nationalism in Local 8. A. Philip Randolph 
and Chandler Owen's black socialist monthly, The Messenger, reported in the 
summer of 1921, in the midst of Local 8's suspension, that at one meeting, 
"Alleged Negro leaders masquerading in the guise of race loyalty" urged the 
black members present to form an all-black longshoremen's union. While the 
UNIA's name is not mentioned, it is reasonable to assume that blacks calling for 
the voluntary segregation of unionists could have been influenced by 
Garveyism; no doubt the UNIA was interested in expanding its base to one of 
the most powerful black organizations in Philadelphia. Not surprisingly, The 
Messenger k editors compared the idea of segregated unionism to Jim Crow or, 
"the Southern bugaboo."35 
Perhaps more surprising, black and white unionists disapproved of these 
attempts to split their ranks and continued to promote integration. Randolph 
and Owen, who frequently endorsed the racially inclusive policies of the IWW, 
approvingly noted that separation of workers into different unions according to 
their race "has been routed by the plain, unvarnished workers. In the Marine 
Transport Workers Industrial Union, No. 8, there are 3,500 men, three-fifths of 
whom are Negroes." Still, to prevent further attacks from black nationalists, the 
membership decided to increase their educational efforts in order to remind the 
longshoremen of the advantages of their interracial organization. The 
Messenger quoted one member proudly declaring, "We have no distinctions in 
this union." Meetings continued to be run by an African American chairman 
and a secretary of European descent. As the black longshoremen James Fair 
later recalled, "To my knowing at that time the IWW was the only thing that 
was accepting negro or black workers ... I mean freely. They would accept them 
and they did advocate just this thing, solidarity." Local 8 translated this egali- 
tarian ideal from its union hall to the workplace; Fair also noted, "We worked 
decks together, we worked on the wharfs [sic] together, we worked in the hold 
together." This striving for equality even affected the union members off the 
job. Prior to the founding of Local 8, black longshoremen faced the threat of 
violence when walking along the waterfront. However, with the advent of the 
union, blacks and whites worked and lived in some of the city's only integrat- 
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ed neighborhoods. Further, Willy Krupsky, a retired longshoreman and the son 
of a Russian immigrant who worked as a longshoreman in Philadelphia, 
recalled in a 1980 interview attending an interracial picnic, when Willy was just 
a young boy. "I went to this picnic, a longshoreman's picnic, so it had to be in 
the early twenties.. .It was mixed, white and black were there, everybody knew 
one another, and we had a good time there. And that's the only picnic I [ever] 
remember going to, a longshoremen's picnic."36 
Local 8's weekly series of Friday evening educational forums displayed the 
wide range of issues that concerned the membership but focused conspicuous- 
ly on race. The first discussion, which hundreds of men and women attended 
involved "The Relation of Organized Labor to Race Riots." The lecturer com- 
pared race wars to wars between nations, both of which benefited employers 
and their profit margins to the detriment of workers. In race riots, workers, 
divided along racial lines, allowed bosses to consolidate their power. Using a 
"colorful" metaphor, one speaker claimed, "If the white and black working 
dogs [sic] are kept fighting over the bone of race prejudice, the artful, hypo- 
critical yellow capitalist dog will steal up and grab the meat of profit." He went 
on to contend that the segregated locals of the AFL's International 
Longshoremen's Association (ILA) played into the employers' hands by 
encouraging divisions on the waterfront. Numerous people that evening con- 
demned the recent, brutal race riot in Tulsa, blaming the Ku Klux Klan for 
doing the employers' dirty work. Thus, while the city and country's racial cli- 
mate continued to deteriorate in the early 1920s, the IWW's Local 8 provided 
its black and white members with an alternative to the prevailing tensions. 
Within the union, Philadelphia's waterfront workers had an opportunity to 
improve their lives together, which explains their loyalty in the midst of the bru- 
tal fighting between the local and national over communism and centraliza- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  
It seems clear that Philadelphia's longshoremen wanted to remain in the 
IWW but believed, based upon the evidence and logic most forcefully provid- 
ed by Doree, that lower initiation fees would destroy their union. Time and 
again since 1913, Local 8's members had demonstrated their commitment to 
the IWW. They had suffered greatly from their affiliation with the IWW -their 
leaders jailed, offices raided, members spied on, and strikes crushed by a com- 
bination of private (employer and media) and public (city and federal) repres- 
sion. Even after the wartime raids, the longshoremen participated in a wide 
range of IWW activities, including conventions and fundraisers for those 
imprisoned in the "class war." Simultaneously, the AFL's ILA made frequent 
overtures to the Philadelphia longshoremen as the only non-ILA port on the 
Atlantic coast. Joining the AFL would have made their union membership more 
palatable for their employers and themselves, especially during the war years 
when coast-wide agreements formally excluded Local 8. Still, despite massive 
employer opposition and increasing red baiting, the longshoremen remained 
committed to the IWW, if only they could preserve their own strength. The 
black longshoremen's loyalty to Local 8 parallels the experiences of black 
workers in other left-wing unions, such as the Alabama Sharecroppers Union 
in the 1930s, and both the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's 
Union and the United Packinghouse Workers in the 1940s and 1950s. The 
numerous telegrams and letters from Philadelphia to Chicago and New York 
throughout the fall of 1920 thoroughly explained Local 8's position on initia- 
tion fees. True, as Dubofsky correctly notes, the Philadelphia Controversy par- 
tially resulted from the intransigence of the IWW's leadership. But, as Fletcher, 
Gambs, and Thompson suggest, mostly the issue became intricately linked with 
the IWW's evolving relations with the Soviet Union and c o m m u n i ~ r n . ~ ~  
Local 8's insistence on maintaining an unconstitutional initiation fee 
reveals how committed they were, first and foremost, to each other, their local 
union, and to what they believed were the "true" ideals of the IWW. The long- 
shoremen placed their faith in the local union and its leaders. As discussed 
above, the membership did not place nearly as much trust in the leadership of 
their industrial union or national organization, whom they believed to be either 
unnecessarily domineering or communist-controlled. Considering the MTW's 
and GEB's post-war inadequacies and reversals over communism, Local 8's 
lack of faith is not surprising. The only GEB member whom Local 8 trusted 
was George Speed, who had helped found Local 8 in 19 13. But even Speed, 
who quickly convinced them to stop loading the ammunition - impressive con- 
sidering the countless tons of munitions loaded over the last six years - could 
not convince the longshoremen to lower their initiation fee. The longshoremen 
had fought many battles against employers and the government to preserve 
their union. In the final analysis, Philadelphia's longshoremen believed more 
strongly in the local organization they had built themselves than the union at 
large.39 
Nevertheless, Philadelphia's longshoremen wanted to return to the IWW 
and appeared at the IWW's national convention in May 192 1 to discuss the mat- 
ter. Local 8 sent a mixed-race delegation to Chicago to argue their case, in addi- 
tion to delivering a letter from E. F. Doree. The convention devoted "two days 
of earnest debate" to the suspension of Local 8. George McKenna, who had 
been active in Local 8 since 1913, spent half a day facing questions from the 
floor and insisted that his branch would lose job control if they changed their 
current policy. A good number of other delegates agreed with the 
Philadelphians' argument. Some delegates supported Local 8 but believed that 
the GEB had acted correctly, as the constitution clearly mandated a maximum 
initiation fee. In the end, though, those present decided to stand by the GEB's 
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action of December 1, 1920. Shortly thereafter, a second motion passed that 
allowed for the immediate reinstatement of Local 8 as soon as it lowered its ini- 
tiation fee. The convention also upheld the March 1921 suspension of a New 
York local of Italian bakers that charged an unconstitutionally high initiation 
fee of $15. Indicating some support for higher initiation fees, representatives of 
the Agricultural Workers Industrial Union introduced a resolution calling for a 
sliding scale on initiation fees from zero to $15, but that motion lost. There was 
little else Local 8's representatives could do.40 
A few days later, the Philadelphians received a telegram from their branch 
stating, "Instruction of body if not reinstated after Phila [sic] controversy return 
home at once. Body knows change means suicide." Whereafter Charles Carter, 
William Green, and McKenna left Chicago, being given ninety more days to 
comply with the constitution or else the IWW threatened to establish a new 
branch of the MTW for Philadelphia's "loyal" longshoremen and transfer the 
400 seamen and firemen to a separate MTW branch. When Doree, still serving 
time in Leavenworth, heard about the convention, he poignantly wrote to his 
wife, "It is hard to recall 15 years service in an organization and then, while in 
prison because of activities in its behalf, to be thrown out ... But by all means 
boys, stick, stand together. Let nothing separate you. You boys of the marine 
industry, must build a better and stronger union. We are with you in spirit if not 
in body."41 
Not much is known about the Philadelphia longshoremen during their sus- 
pension. What is clear is that the longshoremen did not simply relinquish their 
control of the waterfront because they were suspended. The union continued to 
organize, educate, and agitate among the city's waterfront workers. The local 
issued a regular bulletin for the benefit of its members. In addition to their reg- 
ular Tuesday evening meetings, Local 8 held open forums every Friday 
evening; A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owens, the CO-editors of The 
Messenger, spoke at numerous Friday forums that summer. The local held larg- 
er meetings periodically at places like the People's House, Workingmen's 
Singing Society Hall, Labor Lyceum, and Lithuanian Hall. When out on bail, 
Local 8 leaders Walter Nef and E. F. Doree still participated in city-wide IWW 
a ~ t i v i t i e s . ~ ~  
Finally, almost a year after being suspended, Local 8 was reinstated into 
the IWW. The Philadelphians had agreed to the IWW's demands, most notably 
to charge the standard $2 initiation fee. On its front page, Indtlstrial Solidarity 
hailed the return of the MTW's "most powerful subdivision, numbering sever- 
al thousand members, and [still] commanding complete job control on the 
waterfront." The paper went on to proclaim Local 8 as "the most striking exam- 
ple ever seen in this country of the possibility of working-class solidarity 
between whites and Negroes. A large proportion of these fellow workers are 
colored and these proved to be among the most devoted and class conscious 
members of the union."43 
It is not clear why Local 8 suddenly agreed to lower its initiation fee, 
although most likely the longshoremen felt that they needed the support of the 
larger organization. In 1921 the maritime economy in Philadelphia experienced 
a depression. While the port's activity still far exceeded that of the era prior to 
America's entry into the war, from 1920 to 192 1 the value of the port's foreign 
trade, the docks Local 8 controlled, dropped by close to $500,000,000. The 
city's Commercial Exchange concluded in its annual report that the transition 
from governmental control back to normal trade had proven difficult. For 
instance, the nation's railroads raised freight rates to Philadelphia by 40%; as a 
result, Philadelphia's grain exports dropped dramatically as merchants trans- 
ferred their grain to Gulf Coast ports. The national American Bureau of 
Shipping also lamented "the slump" which the entire industry experienced after 
the war. Less activity in the port meant less work for Local 8's longshoremen; 
hence their position was weaker than in previous years.44 
In addition, Local 8 felt increasing competition from the AFCs longshore- 
men's union. The ILA periodically reappeared on the Philadelphia waterfront, 
usually in times of crisis. The Philadelphia Controversy proved no different. 
Continuing a partnership initiated during the war, maritime employers and the 
United States Shipping Board (USSB) collaborated to bring the ILA into 
Philadelphia in order to supplant Local 8 - the government and AFL still 
viewed Local 8 as a part of the IWW even if the IWW did not. The relationship 
grew even tighter as T. V. O'Connor, a former ILA president, assumed control 
of the U.S. Shipping Board. There are scattered references to the resurgence of 
the ILA in correspondence between the secretary of the MTW in Philadelphia 
and several Local 8 leaders still in L e a ~ e n w o r t h . ~ ~  
In fact, the ILA troubled Philadelphia Wobblies greatly. Philadelphia based 
agent J. F. McDevitt of the federal Department of Justice's Bureau of 
Investigation reported in June 192 1 that over the last few months several hun- 
dred Wobblies had joined the ILA, led by African American organizer Glenn 
Perrymore, who had played a key role in Local 8's 1916 strike. The report of 
another agent, S. Busha, reveals that by July 1921, the ILA had chartered a new 
branch there, Local 11 16, and managed to sign up over 1,000 longshoremen. 
Lending credence to both Ben Fletcher's and Fred Thompson's allegations, 
McDevitt believed that the defections resulted from disagreements over the 
Communist Party and favoritism in hiring. Perhaps most troubling for those 
loyal to Local 8, all of the new ILA longshoremen were African American, 
thereby endangering Local 8's precious interracial unity.46 
Local 8 responded to this threat by reminding Philadelphia's black long- 
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shoremen of the AFL's racist policies. Local 8 issued a waterfront circular dis- 
cussing racism in the AFL, which supported the Ku Klux Klan and the Tulsa 
race riot, according to the IWW. And no black worker needed to be reminded 
that many AFL unions denied blacks membership as a matter of course. The 
presence of the highly respected black socialists A. Philip Randolph and 
Chandler Owens, who championed the interracial solidarity of Local 8 and the 
IWW, at numerous Local 8 open forums that summer was no coincidence. Also 
disturbing, at both their regular Tuesday night business meetings and Friday 
night open forums many Wobblies had heated arguments on the subjects, with 
some threats made against anyone who remained in the ILA. Further, Local 8's 
leaders believed that employers were, once again, trying to drive a wedge 
between the city's black and white longshoremen. In an appendix to The 
Philadelphia Controversy, Local 8 reprinted a suspicious waterfront circular 
that encouraged the black longshoremen to form an "Independent Union of 
Colored Workers," which had the "backing" of the Employing Stevedores 
Committee. The Philadelphia Controversy also included Local 8's response, 
which urged longshoremen to "beware of union disrupters" who tried to divide 
the union along racial lines.47 
Local 8 managed to close ranks and rebuff the latest ILA challenge. Quite 
likely, the reinstatement of Local 8 into the IWW was instrumental. Given 
Local 8's and the IWW's commitment to and history of interracial solidarity, 
the African American longshoremen could rest assured that they would be 
treated equally and with respect. There is little question that in the early 1920s, 
blacks in Philadelphia experienced tremendous discrimination outside of Local 
8. Similarly, the AFL devoted little energy either to opening up its membership 
to blacks or protecting their interests. Or, perhaps Local 8's strong-arm tactics 
of expelling any longshoreman who took out a second union card and joined 
the ILA, was decisive; as the longshoremen who flirted with the ILA discov- 
ered, the IWW still had a great deal of power on the Philadelphia waterfront, if 
not in many other parts of the nation. The lack of a Local 8 button meant, quite 
simply, no work on many docks. No matter how it occurred, Local 8 had with- 
stood another challenge to its existence. Local 8 would find itself in a bitter and 
ultimately destructive lockout/strike near the end of 1922, in which employers 
successfully played the race card to divide the union members and break the 
power of Local 8. For the next five years Open Shop conditions existed while 
the IWW and ILA battled for the allegiance of the longshoremen. Ultimately, 
in 1927, the ILA gained control in Philadelphia, the last major port to align 
with the AFL. The crucial factors had been the active support of the U. S. 
Shipping Board, headed by a former ILA president, and the leadership of Polly 
Baker, an old Wobbly leader and Lithuanian immigrant, who successfully bro- 
kered a deal between the black and white dock workers to ensure black leader- 
ship in the new ILA local.4x 
Historian Melvyn Dubofsky has argued that the IWW's decline began and 
essentially ended in 19 17- 19 18, with massive employer and federal govern- 
ment repression. After the war the IWW stumbled on near-death, as it were, due 
to its own misguided policies and inability to adjust to the changing realities of 
the postwar era, that among other things led to the Communist Party's eventu- 
al dominance of the American Left. The continued power of Local 8, though, 
contradicts Dubofsky's claim that the IWW had ceased to be an effective labor 
organization and had become only a "legal defense organization" after the war- 
time raids. Fred Thompson, the unofficial historian of the IWW for over thirty 
years, offers a different theory. In 1972 Thompson wrote that he believed "the 
historians are quite in error in figuring the repression killed the IWW. I believe 
it was about as sturdy as it ever was in the summer of 1923, and that develop- 
ment from that point to its disruption in the 1924 split was its unfolding." 
Thompson's view is too optimistic. Despite maintaining members comparable 
to prewar levels, the IWW never recovered from the wartime government and 
employer repression. Too, the rise of the CP sapped energy away from the IWW 
after the war. But, clearly, the IWW - in Philadelphia, in Oklahoma, and in the 
Northwest - still was quite active in the early 1 9 2 0 ~ . ~ ~  
Thompson's contention regarding the significance of IWW infighting 
needs to be modified to factor in the series of events that came to be known 
simply as the Philadelphia Controversy, and suggests that the IWW was in dis- 
array prior to the 1923- 1924 Emergency Program battle Thompson believes 
crucial. After World War I, while the national IWW and soon all of organized 
labor was reeling from a combined employer-government offensive, Local 8 
had persevered. Even after its aborted strike of 9,000 waterfront workers in the 
summer of 1920, Local 8 maintained its strong position on the Philadelphia 
waterfront. Considering that it was one of the most, if not the most powerful 
local in the entire IWW at the time, it is reasonable to assume that the nation- 
al organization would have done all in its power to ensure the continued health 
and allegiance of Local 8. That, however, is not what occurred. In fact, the 
IWW, through the IWW's General Executive Board in Chicago and MTW's 
national headquarters in New York City, did the exact opposite. At a time when 
the IWW should have been attempting to resuscitate its ailing organization, by 
building on still vital branches such as Local 8, the IWW chose to suspend 
Local 8 over an issue of debatable importance. Or as IWW organizer Claude 
Erwin put it in 1925, "First and greatest, because it hinders greatest, is internal 
d i s s e n s i ~ n . " ~ ~  
There is no single reason that the Philadelphia Controversy occurred. The 
depleted leadership ranks of the IWW, due to the wartime trials, had allowed a 
new cadre to take control of the General Executive Board, which, according to 
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Dubofsky, apparently felt the need to assert its authority since it rested on no 
natural power base. And, as John Gambs notes, this postwar IWW leadership 
was decidedly pro-Soviet and worked to move the IWW towards communism. 
Local 8 also suffered from the wartime arrests, with its five most prominent 
leaders, especially Fletcher, sentenced to long terms in Leavenworth. That the 
longshoremen of Local 8 wished to remain in the IWW at this time of internal 
disarray and external repression amply demonstrates the commitment the long- 
shoremen had to the IWW. Local 8's allegiance had its limits, however, as both 
the interest of some of the union's black longshoremen with the ILA and UNIA 
and the longshoremen's refusal to back down on initiation fees proved. As the 
Philadelphians demonstrated, they were not willing to maintain their IWW 
membership if that meant upsetting their local organization. Attacks on Local 
8 from the national organization and communist manipulations, combined with 
employer and governmental opposition, might have led Philadelphia's long- 
shoremen to abandon the IWW. Considering the deteriorating situation for 
African Americans and immigrants in Philadelphia and the nation at large, 
interracial, multiethnic organizations were both in short supply and increasing 
need. The men of Local 8 remained dedicated to the IWW's first principles of 
industrial unionism and solidarity, but refused to sacrifice their organization to 
the sectarian infighting that the (American) Left has became famous for. That 
a satisfactory solution could not be found by Local 8 or the national IWW indi- 
cates the profound crisis that the IWW experienced after World War I. In par- 
ticular, the appearance of communism caused a fundamental realignment in left 
wing labor and political circles and the IWW was caught in this whirlwind. By 
the time the IWW decided to reject communism, the damage already had been 
done to its organization. Thus, the IWW expelled its largest, most powerful, and 
only interracial local, a questionable decision even in good times. That the 
IWW was willing to jettison Local 8 is indicative of the disarray that the IWW 
experienced in the early 1920s, primarily due to the battles over communism 
and centralization, and lends significant credence to the theory that the IWW, 
rather than its opponents, finally crippled the organization. 
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